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  Introduction  
  In January 2017, as temperatures reached -20 degrees in Serbia, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees reported that around 1000 refugees were living in 
abandoned warehouses in central Belgrade (UNHCR 2017a). This derelict settlement (known 
as ‘The Barracks’) has since been evicted and demolished, because it was located on a piece 
of land earmarked for a new, luxury development of hotels and apartments - the £2.8bn 
‘Belgrade Waterfront’, funded by an Emirati Investment firm and the Serbian government. The 
squat, occupied by refugees and attended to by ad hoc networks of volunteers and activists, 
forms a part of the ‘constellation of camps’ (Davies et al 2015:93) and informal settlements 
(Tsavdaroglou 2018; Mudu and Chatopadhyay 2017; Depraetere and Oosterlynck 2017) 
emerging across Europe. Informal settlements, where refugees experience ‘violent 
abandonment’ of host states (Davies et al 2015:93). Settlements existing outside of formal 
refugee camps have become an integral part of refugee journeys, but also form a focal point 
for host states’ surveillance and regulatory practices directed at refugees. Whereas formal 
camps in transit countries act as ‘stations’ and ‘stop over points’ on migratory routes to 
Western and Northern Europe (Tsianos and Karakayali 2010:384), but they produce 
rationalities and effects which have a direct bearing on the refugees’ presence in (or removal 
from) urban areas, as this paper discusses.   
This paper examines the urban and spatial politics of refugee journeys through transit 
countries; specifically, it considers the relationship between urban spaces adapted and used 
by refugees and solidarity activists, and the biopolitical rationalities of neoliberalism, the state 
and the EU border regimes. I argue that, for transit states along migratory routes, refugees in 
urban and public spaces play two converging roles: first, they are seen as bodies occupying 
commercial areas and second, they are subjects of migration and asylum policies, and as 
such are subjected to constant intervention, scrutiny, counting and management. I argue that 
the refugees’ dual roles, as ‘disruptors’ of commercial development and migratory subjects, 
mean that state authorities are keen to not only push them away from public spaces, but also 
push them towards camps, for which national governments of transit countries receive EU 
	
	
funding. This differentiates refugee populations from other marginalised groups, such as the 
homeless: there are no comparable spaces designated for other urban ‘undesirables’ 
especially none which are funded by external/international actors. This is especially the case 
in migratory transit countries such as in South Eastern Europe, where the under-developed 
welfare sectors have poor provision for homelessness and other types of social 
marginalisation, but where conversely, refugee accommodation is relatively well funded by 
external actors such as the EU. 
Using Belgrade as a case study, I show how the state’s commercial interests in the city 
centre property development became intertwined with its implementation of asylum policies 
requiring all refugees to reside in official, state-run camps, subsequently resulting in constant 
surveillance, conduct and regulation of refugee bodies in urban areas. The surveillance and 
regulation of refugee bodies are, in turn, carried out by a constellation of actors at state, city 
and municipal levels, and includes property developers, business owners, local residents, 
migration workers and the police. The constellation of actors often engages in seemingly banal 
practices restricting the use of public space, such as evictions, putting up fences, and 
demolitions of informal settlements, which are intended to encourage refugees to register 
themselves for residence in official camps. Refugees in urban areas are attended to by 
networks of aid organisations, volunteers and activists, who often frame their work as 
resistance against state and/or EU border regimes, but whose work sometimes unwittingly 
supports the rationalities of government through the focus on counting refugees or working 
with state authorities. Against this background, I highlight the importance of understanding 
local politics and pre-existing contestations over space, and their entanglement in the 
‘flexibility’ of modern borders (Medzzara and Neilson 2012:65)  
 The paper builds on literature which suggests that geography and space, particularly 
harsh and inhospitable physical environments, feature in border control strategies, but also in 
their subversion (Doty 2011; Mountz 2013; Rygiel 2011; Davies et al 2017; Johnson 2016; 
Squire 2015). For refugees, cities can become ‘biopolitical spaces […] where migrant lives are 
held hostage’, but also spaces where the biopolitical regime can be challenged (Topak 2014: 
830; Doty 2011). In Belgrade, refugees and aid groups challenged the urban order by finding 
new and innovative ways of making their physical environments more ‘survivable’ (c.f. 
Johnson 2015). The authorities continually deployed the urban environment against refugees 
and activists through surveillance, evictions or demolitions (often coinciding with ongoing 
construction of the Belgrade Waterfront), but also by actively pushing refugees towards official 
camps. 
Using the framework of biopolitics - the management of life and bodies (Foucault 2000) - 
the paper reflects on rationalities of capitalism, development and urban regeneration, which 
have spatial effects on lives and movement across cities, as well as borders. I use the 
	
	
biopolitical framework in order to reveal the ‘subtle wielding of contemporary power’ (Doty 
2010). Biopolitics of urban environments - implicit and explicit rules about who can use public 
spaces and when, rationalities of neoliberalism and regeneration, surveillance of space and 
contestations over land use - have a direct impact on the emergence of informal camps and 
zones of exclusion (Rygiel 2011), and hence shape the lives and everyday struggles of 
refugees and their aid providers. Host countries often ‘regulate the presence of refugees in 
urban areas’ to prevent integration and reduce their agency (Fabos and Kibreab 2007:5), and 
generally prefer asylum seekers and refugees to reside in official camps (Johnson 2016). As 
Sanyal notes (2012:637-639), the presence of refugees in the city complicates the strategy of 
containment pursued by most governments, and hence refugees’ presence in cities is often 
clandestine, criminalised or seen as a ‘hindrance to urban development’, which the Belgrade 
case illustrates.   
A rich literature documents the increasing interest of refugees living in cities, which now 
make up half of the world’s refugee population (Sanyal 2012:633; Maestri and Hughes 2017). 
Many of the discussions around urban refugees focus on how claims to citizenship and 
belonging are made in urban spaces (Maestri and Hughes 2017; Bauder 2016; Nyers 2010; 
McNevin 2006). Recent work also explores the use of urban spaces to stage protests, build 
solidarity and resist violence of border regimes (Depraerte; Nordling et al 2017; Johnson 
2016), and examines the extent to which refugee squats in constitute a ‘radical autonomy’ 
(Mudu and Chattopadhyay 2017). For instance, writing about the Maximillian park in Brussels, 
Depraetere and Oosterlynck (2017:705) note that the park ‘became a site for acts of 
citizenship’ where volunteers became ‘political actors by taking up responsibility for incoming 
refugees.’ However, as Nordling et al (2017) argue, such spaces are ambiguous. They are 
‘not spaces for clear cut political activism or insurgency, but neither are they spaces only of 
care, hospitality or compassion’ as they can ‘become political…in unpredictable ways’ (Nyers 
2017:731). Thus, informal spaces or spaces of solidarity cannot be seen only in terms of 
‘resistance’ to border regimes or authorities (a position activists often adopt): informal 
‘resistance’ based aid groups sometimes become a part of the state’s own apparatus for 
accommodating refugees once they start working formally in camps for instance (as is the 
case with a number of Belgrade-based NGOs). Some activist groups also adopt more 
pragmatic positions and cooperate with authorities,  whilst other aid groups find that they have 
to rely on state- or city- level authorities and services (such as police and social work) in order 
to meet the needs of specific groups of refugees, such as unaccompanied minors. 
 Emergent literature also considers the ‘commons’ arising out of informal refugee 
settlements and cooperatives in places like Athens, and considering cooperative housing in 
terms of articulation of rights, identities and collectivities (Tsavdaroglou 2018). As 
Tsavdaroglou (2018:19) explains, this discussion builds on existing literature on urban 
	
	
solidarity and social movements ‘which have the ability to destabilise state-led policies’ and 
upset ‘dominant taxonomies of urban spaces’. However, as I argue, considering informal 
refugee settlements in urban centres also necessitates an analysis of how they are affected 
not just by the state, but also by neoliberalisaton, financial capital, property development and 
local politics in which they are embedded. 
I build on the existing literature which considers the presence of refugees in cities, but I 
also extend the discussion by suggesting that refugees’ and activists ability to use, adapt and 
make spaces political or sites of citizenship, is circumscribed by the existence of official 
refugee camps (towards which authorities actively push refugees), rules, regulations and 
biopolitics of urban environments and neoliberalism which inevitably manage and restrict 
access to seemingly ‘free’ public spaces (Bulley 2016). I do this by taking a closer look at the 
relationships between urban space, financial capital and state power and the effects they 
produce.  
  Belgrade is used as a case study to illustrate the convergences of migration and 
neoliberalisation. The city is an especially rich case study showing what happens when 
refugees become a part of local debates about state-led property redevelopment, whilst also 
being the subjects of a well-funded EU assistance programme that has increased the number 
of refugee camps in the country. To date, the EU has provided financial assistance to Serbia 
worth EUR 80 million, for ‘better border management, running costs of the centres [refugee 
camps] and also for improving reception conditions and provisions of services in the education 
and the health sector.’1 The presence of EU funds has created spaces towards which refugees 
could ‘legitimately’ be conducted towards once they were evicted from urban areas.  
Belgrade also embodies urban transformations typical of post-socialist cities, where 
appropriations of public space are marked continuities ‘of dominant state power […], neoliberal 
economy, everyday corruption and haphazard attempts by civil society to […] inscribe its own 
signs into the cityscape’ (Darieva and Kaschuba 2011:14). As a case study, it sheds a light on 
the effects of rapid neoliberalisation and ‘wild capitalism’ with ‘rapacious rent-seeking’, 
absence and/or a disregard for state regulation, semi-legal business activity, an informal 
economy (Upchurch and Marinkovic 2018) and a distribution of capital based on clientism 
(Harloe 2011). It shows clearly the spatial effects of a rapid transition (Sykora and Bouzarovski 
2011), which include construction booms and privatisation of formerly state-owned properties 
(see e.g. Pugh 2005), but also informal or illegal construction in public spaces (Vojovic and 
Petrovic 2007; Hirt 2008). This also means that Belgrade allows us to observe the rapid 
disappearance and ‘monetarization’ of public spaces, which often takes places with the aid of 
state authorities or individuals in office (Pugh 2005:448). In turn, we can observe that in 
‘transition’ countries, neoliberalisation often involves a principal actor (c.f. Hirt 2013:30) – the 
	
	
state – which also happens to play the same central role in other core functions, such as 
migration policy, and we can thus observe how migration and neoliberalism intersect.  
   This paper is structured as follows. I first outline the methodology. Then, the following 
section defines the key concepts used in the paper, and engages in a discussion of biopolitics 
and neoliberalism. The next section provides a short background to the refugee crisis in 
Serbia, noting in particular its spatial effects. The subsequent section describes spaces and 
spatial practices employed by activists and authorities, explored through descriptions of key 
spaces: public parks, squats and aid centres in Belgrade. Each discussion of a specific site 
charts how public spaces used by refugees and activists transformed, over time, into 





This paper is based on extensive qualitative data gathered over the course of six trips to 
Belgrade, between November 2015 and June 20182. The total amount of time spent in the city 
over the course of these trips was nine weeks. The aim was to understand, ‘from below’, the 
effects of urban transformation, evictions and demolitions linked to the Waterfront 
development, on refugee communities and their supporters. To this end, I collected forty-six 
interviews and around sixty informal conversations, which participants consented to being 
used but did not want to have recorded. The interviews and conversations were with: staff 
from the major aid organisations and NGOs working with refugees in Serbia (some 
organisations, such as Refugee Aid Serbia and Medicines Sans Frontieres were interviewed 
multiple times), smaller local aid organisations such as Info Park NGO, smaller international 
and volunteer-led organisations such as the BelgraAid NGO; a major international donor 
agency; officials from the Serbian Commissariat for Refugees, a state agency responsible for 
housing and looking after refugees; staff managing an official refugee reception centre on the 
outskirts of Belgrade; European activists from the No Border movement, local volunteers and 
activists, social workers, interpreters, local researchers, academics, squatters and refugees. 
When citing interviewees, I specify whether the interviewee is an ‘aid worker’ (working for an 
NGO or larger organisation), a volunteer, or an activist (a label some interviewees chose to 
describe themselves).  
 I employed ethnographic research methods throughout: for instance, I shadowed and 
observed the No Border activists in their work, and participated in a squat clean-up they had 
organised. I observed the work and interactions of other activists and aid workers. For 
instance, over multiple visits, I observed the day-to-day work of volunteers, social workers and 
interpreters at three volunteer-run refugee support centres. During the course of my 
	
	
observations of activist groups in particular, I was granted access to the refugee squats, where 
I was able to observe at first hand their living conditions. Throughout my extensive 
observations of the local parks, the aid centres, squats and other focal points, I was also able 
to sketch out more extensive pictures about how these spaces are used and navigated by 
various groups, and I draw on those observations in this paper. Whilst immersive and based 
on participant observation, this project is not extensive enough to be ‘an ethnography’ and I 
make no claims as such; I merely note that the methods employed drew on ethnographic 
practices such as participant observation.  
 The majority of the interviews I carried out were with volunteers and activists, and I am 
aware of the potential ways in which this may skew the interpretation of data, and it does 
indeed place the emphasis on their experience of the state and the state’s role in regulating 
public spaces.  Further, despite wishing to interview refugees and include their stories in this 
paper, the language barriers made in-depth interviews and discussions difficult (though, we 
did manage a number of conversations). Therefore, I make no claims about this data being 
representative in any way; the limitations mean that the data shows my interpretation of how 
the informal settlements were used and how they were affected by the Waterfront 
development and local authorities.  
 
Cities, neoliberalism and biopolitics  
 
Migration scholars have theorised how physical spaces might be used as migration 
‘deterrents’ and tools to counter resistance movements’ solidarity efforts (Doty 2011; Johnson 
2015; Squire 2014). Physical environments such as deserts, Doty (2011:607) suggests, are 
so harsh and have a ‘raw physicality’, that they can be ‘put to use and function to mask the 
workings of social and political power’. Reflecting on the US border policy, Doty (2011:607) 
argues that deaths of migrants trying to reach the US through the desert, can be blamed - by 
the authorities - on harsh weather conditions and ‘natural causes’, thus allowing them to evade 
responsibility. Whilst cities are not comparable to deserts, Doty’s point is echoed by scholars 
who suggest that urban environments are continuously and intentionally made inhospitable 
and unsurvivable for groups (such as the homeless for instance) who are not deemed to be a 
‘legitimate’ part of the public (Fraser 1990; Mitchell 1995; Davis 1990; Bulley 2016).   
 What cities look like, how public spaces are to be used, and what can and cannot be 
done, built or demolished in the urban environment are the results of local and/or global 
practices, rules and regulations constructed and maintained by authorities, institutions, capital, 
agents and individual actors - what Foucault conceptualised as biopolitics or the technologies 
of power (Foucault 1997: 246). Foucault saw biopolitics as interventions into and management 
of life, which also included ’control over relations between the human race….and their 
	
	
environment, the milieu in which they live’ (Foucault 1997:245). Foucault notes further that 
biopolitics ‘deals with the population […] as a political problem […] a biological problem and 
as power’s problem’ (Foucault 1997:246).   
  Foucault saw biopolitics as operating through ‘territorial controls and surveillance, 
practices of death and exclusion and the suspension of rights’ (Topak 2014:830). Urban 
environments show how this works on a smaller scale. In cities, biopolitical processes, Kraftl 
(2014:275275) argues, can be ‘constituted through architectural practices’, including design, 
planning and inhabitation; that is, urban design is deployed for purposes of biopolitical control, 
often visible, as Kraftl (2014) shows, in the ways in which housing estates are structured to 
shape their inhabitants lives in specific ways. This resonates with work of urban theorists and 
geographers who suggest that space in cities is governed such that bodies move through 
urban environments in particular ways (Bulley 2016). Discussing spatial governing of cities 
Bulley (2016:244) distinguishes the surveillance of a space - whereby a space is closed and 
bordered - and the regulation of a space, which takes place through more liberal forms of 
conduct, such as regulation of flows of people and goods through open spaces. Further, Bulley 
(2016: 245-246) suggests that circulation around cities is not completely free, because we are 
‘conducted into certain areas’ and away from others, often through ‘mundane, everyday 
tactics’ such as transport links or licensing laws, and movements such as Occupy, attempt to 
disrupt the cities’ attempt at regulation of these flows. Seemingly mundane practices contribute 
to what Foucault saw as ‘the actual production of self-governed life within modern spaces’ 
(Sparke 2006:157), and adaptation of individual behaviours in line with expected norms.    
In cities, regulatory practices and conduct of people through physical spaces are also 
shaped by neoliberalism and commercial activity as well as shadow economies, such as 
people smuggling. Here, I adopt a broad (though not uncontested) definition of neoliberalism 
as an ideology ‘organised around the twin ideas of liberalising the capitalist market from state 
control and refashioning state practices in the idealised image of the free market’ (Sparke 
2006:153-154). Peck et al (2011) argue that neoliberalism can more accurately be described 
as a process of ‘neoliberalisation’. In post-socialist contexts, this has seen governments 
implement neoliberal economic policies characterised by deregulation, roll back of the state 
and its intervention, and privatisation of state-owned enterprises and services (Jessop 
2002:454). Neoliberalism in various ‘transition’ contexts has thus ‘become the dominant 
ideological rationalization for globalization and contemporary state “reform”’ (Brenner and 
Theodore 2009:94).     
 Importantly, as Sparke (2006:154-157) argues, despite emphasis on ‘deregulation’, 
‘neoliberalism leads in practice to re-regulation’ in ways that can be observed if we examine 
the ‘messy actualities’ and the ‘nitty gritty activities of biopolitical production’ of specific 
neoliberal projects.  For instance, Springer (2010:1033) notes that neoliberalism can be seen 
	
	
as a form of Foucauldian governmentality, and as ‘an assemblage of rationalities, strategies, 
technologies, and techniques’ that allow for ‘governance at a distance’ (Barry et al. 1996 in 
Springer 2010:1033). One effect resulting from this assemblage and its self-disciplining of 
subjects, is that neoliberalism privileges ‘individuals who conform to the norms of the market’ 
whilst those who do not, such as the homeless, are ‘managed’ and disciplined through security 
regimes of surveillance, policing and border controls (Springer 2010:1033). 
 Viewed from the vantage point of cities, it is possible to observe the ’nitty gritty activities 
of biopolitical production’ (Sparke 2006:154-157) and the ways in which they derive both from 
neoliberalisation and border control. Refugees, like other urban ‘undesirables’ are assumed 
not conform to the capitalist logic outlined by Springer (2010). In reality, they often do have 
access to financial capital but their ability to access sites of commerce is regulated both 
explicitly and implicitly, by authorities policing the ‘porous borders’ (Tsianos and Karakayali 
2010:374) in cities, or business owners preventing access to shops and services, for instance.  
The rest of the paper examines biopolitical effects of the convergence of neoliberalism and 
border control on populations that not only ‘deviate’ from the idealised neoliberal-citizen 




Waterfront Development  
  
The story of the refugee crisis in Serbia is one which repeatedly converges with another 
story - that of the investor-led urban regeneration scheme known as ‘Belgrade Waterfront’. 
The Waterfront project embodies the kind of re-regulation of neoliberalism described by 
Sparke (2006:157) in that it shows how, on the one hand, foreign investors could take 
advantage of local deregulation but at the same time, rely on the state to minimise their 
investment risk (c.f. Grubber and Camprag 2018).    
The Waterfront is a large-scale and multi-use project redeveloping 1.77 square kilometres 
of brownfield sites in downtown Belgrade; a run-down, river-side neighbourhood called 
Savamala.  The city’s railway and bus stations are located here, and in 2015 become focal 
points of the refugee crisis. The Savamala neighbourhood had experienced a post-socialist 
‘boom in bottom up spatial interventions’ (Cvetinovic et al 2016:16) as groups and individuals 
developed derelict and abandoned buildings (whose post-socialist ownership was not always 
clear) into bars, clubs and arts centres, some of which later became refugee aid distributions 
points. Waterfront plans includes demolishing much of Savamala and rebuilding the area from 
scratch. This includes moving the central bus and railway stations and demolishing an entire 
area of socialist-era cargo yards and workers’ housing (which later became refugee squats, 
	
	
as discussed below).  
There are few publicly available facts about the project apart from the marketing material 
and press releases, since information has been systematically withheld from the public by the 
State Commission for Protection of Competition and at the request of the investor (Grubbauer 
and Camprag 2018:14). 
The Serbian government is the key partner in the project with an Abu Dhabi-based property 
developer, Eagle Hills, as the only other investor. The project would see the Serbian state 
‘lease 100,000 acres of land to Eagle Hills, to build 200 objects’ and ‘the investor would enjoy 
extra territorial rights over 30 years’ (Matkovic and Ivkovic 2017:6). Eagle Hills develops luxury 
properties, and Waterfront is its only project in Europe3. The project is symptomatic of post-
financial crisis capitalism in which global financial capital becomes ‘anchored’ into the built 
environment (Halbert and Rouanet 2013) and investors from the Middle East seek to diversify 
their income through property development in what would have traditionally been seen as high 
risk markets (Grubber and Camprag 2018). Importantly, as Grubber and Camprag (2018:9-
13) discuss, it is the national government and not local authorities, that have a key role in this 
type of regulatory capitalism as they constantly change the law and regulation, and sidestep 
local government and experts in order to reduce the risk for investors and ensure project 
implementation.   
Waterfront will consist of 6000 luxury apartments, shopping malls, offices for 12,000 
workers, and eight hotels. Whilst some public areas such as the riverside ‘promenade’ and a 
playground are also included, the development has been widely criticised for not building 
affordable housing or adequate public spaces, for being a ‘state-driven’ model of 
‘hypergentrification’ with an ‘absolutely consumerist vision’ (Eror 2105) and ‘an extreme case 
of speculative real estate development driven by the priorities of rent extraction’ (Grubbauer 
and Camprag 2018:12). As such, Belgrade Waterfront is an example numerous ‘urban mega 
projects’ globally that have been criticised on grounds of transparency, lack of benefit to the 
public and accusations of corruption (Mihailovic 2014; Grubbauer and Camprag 2018:1-3). 
Further criticism is levelled at the opaque financing of the project, and it is suspected that 
Serbian state and taxpayers, not investors, are bearing much of the financial liability 
(Greenberg and Spasic 2017:323). The Waterfront development is just one of many instances 
of contemporary neoliberal projects, concerned with ‘voicing the interests of financial and/or 
transnational capital’ (Jessop 2002:455), and which allow us to see how cities become key 
sites through which neoliberalism is reproduced (Peck et al 2009:50). The logic of capitalism 
embodied by Waterfront, which prioritised investment capital, had spatial effects which 





Serbia and the Balkan Route 
 
 Construction of the Waterfront development started in earnest around the same time that 
large numbers of refugees reached Belgrade in 2015.  Serbia, whose hosting of refugees is 
embedded in broader European border policies, became one of the focal points of the Balkan 
Route following the ‘opening’ of the Greece-Macedonia border in 2015, which enabled 
refugees to move northwards, heading for EU borders in Hungary and Croatia (Afouxenidis et 
al 2017:16). However, the subsequent ‘closure’ of Hungarian and Croatian borders from 
autumn 2015 trapped the refugees in Serbia and Greece. The border itself is not sealed, and 
following Tsianis and Karakayali’s calls to move away from the image of a ‘Fortress Europe’ 
(2010), it is important to note that movement (mainly facilitated by smugglers) across South 
East European borders still occurs. However, the Western Balkans’ ‘strongmen’ leaders have 
become ‘indispensable partners managing the EU’s refugee crisis’, with the EU itself 
‘struggling’ to create a unified approach (Pomorska and Noutcheva 2017:170; see also 
Beznec et al 2017).    
Serbia’s approach to asylum is consistent with other countries in the region, in that there 
is an underlying assumption that most refugees reaching the Balkans are not intending to 
settle there (Afouxenidis et al 2017). However, most EU funding appears to be supporting the 
long-term stay of refugees in transit countries. EU funding is comprehensive, and supports 
everything from the additional social workers and interpreters, to improving accommodation 
in camps. EU’s policies have a spatial effect too: refugees cannot access any support services 
unless they are registered as residing in official reception centres, and all of the funding that 
the state receives is based around camps and support services working with camp 
populations. It also means that the Serbian government places a strong emphasis on camps, 
and has an incentive to remove urban refugee populations into camps.  
Serbia’s ‘reception’ or ‘asylum’ centres are in effect, refugee camps though the use of this 
term is avoided by migration officials4. Centres/camps allow for a relative freedom of 
movement. However, many of the camps are isolated, and not served by public transport. The 
camp-containment strategy has not changed, and throughout 2016 and 2017, new camps 
were opened to increase capacity to a total of 17 across the country. All camps provide shelter, 
meals and healthcare, though their quality and frequency is varied. This reflects problems 
across Europe, particularly Greece, where camp conditions vary dramatically between 
locations and with some island camps labelled as ‘total chaos’ (Lamb 2016:710), whilst other 
camps are shown to international visitors as examples of successful refugee accommodation5. 
In a further similarity to Greece, refugees in Serbia sometimes reject camps due to their 
isolation, lack of opportunities for work, integration and mobility (Tsavdaroglou 2018).  
Refugees also report being unable to access camps in Serbia and being turned away by camp 
	
	
officials for various reasons such as ‘incorrect’ paperwork or overcrowding in 2016 when flows 
of people were high6, though this seems to be less of a case at present.   
Since 2015, some groups of refugees in Serbia have been using public spaces - parks, 
garages, derelict buildings - to live, sleep and wait for transport or smugglers. Again, this 
reflects the situation elsewhere in Europe: refugees arriving into Athens in 2015, for instance, 
started to settle in the city’s central public park, Pedion Areos until accommodation was 
available elsewhere (Afouxenidis et al 2017:30). Central urban areas became focal points 
primarily due to their proximity transport hubs by which many arrived and left. But, refugees’ 
use of centrally located urban areas is in part also influenced by smugglers. Smugglers not 
only transport refugees into urban areas, but also choose the locations in which refugees will 
be dropped off, thus unwittingly shaping the geographies of refugee presence in cities. In 
Belgrade, the drop offs continue to be on or in the vicinity of land acquired by the Waterfront 
Project7 as discussed below.  
 
 
Surveillance and regulation of public places and refugee presence 
 
Public spaces such as squares and parks featured prominently in the refugee ‘crisis’, 
mainly as places of protest, solidarity and the delivery of aid (Depraetere and Osterlynck 2017; 
Johnson 2016; Afouxenidis et al 2017). However, public spaces are subject to various explicit 
and implicit rules, regulations and surveillance practices aimed at preventing specific groups 
of people – traditionally, the homeless; more recently, the refugees - from using central, public 
or commercial sites (Fraser 1990; Mitchell 1995; Davis 1990; Bulley 2016). This ‘control 
through the management of space’ as Merry argues, is a form of spatial regulation that often 
involves the production of social order by concealing specific populations and behaviours, 
rather than eliminating them. This, and the temporal nature of spatial regulation where 
concealment occurs at specific times and not others (Merry 2001:17) is evident in the way that 
the Serbian authorities tolerated the presence of refugees in public spaces during the height 
of the media attention in 2015, which very quickly shifted to ‘concealment’ as the Waterfront 
construction got under way later that autumn. The following section reflects on concealment, 
surveillance and regulation by taking a detailed look at four key spaces that started out as 
refugee solidarity sites, but ended up becoming a part of /adjacent to the Waterfront 
development.  
 
The Park/Park View Apartments 
 
When refugees arrived into Belgrade, they found themselves either at the central bus 
	
	
station or one of the parks immediately adjacent to it. According to several plans of the 
Waterfront site, the two public parks appear incorporated into the new development8. 
However, no other information has been provided on this in any public statement by the 
government so my assessment is based solely on the maps provided by developers on the 
Waterfront website. The parks are also one street away from the showpiece ‘Belgrade 
Waterfront Sales Centre’, one of the first buildings to be completed as a part of the project; on 
the same street, activists had set up a refugee aid distribution site in 2015, but as discussed 
below, this turned out to have been on a tranche of land acquired for the development.  
   In the summer of 2015, the two parks became the sites of first informal settlements, as 
people slept in tents. At the time of writing, they are fenced off with Waterfront Billboards 
advertising ‘Park View Apartments’, refugees and activists having been displaced over a 
period of two years. In the early days of the refugees’ arrival into Serbia, the parks became 
physical sites which helped provide basic means of survival but also constitute a refugee 
community and solidarity networks. The sites were adapted to include a Red Cross medical 
clinic, meal distribution points, an ‘Info Park’ information hut, legal aid and meeting points for 
Arabic and Farsi-speaking volunteers.  Exact numbers of people living temporarily in the parks 
are unknown, however, activists estimate them to be in the thousands in the summer of 2015, 
to a few dozen in 20179. Visibility and presence of refugees in a busy, central space was 
important in mobilising local support. The presence of refugees in public spaces also aided 
accessibility, allowing volunteers and agencies to establish contact and provide aid without 
government regulation.  
The local authorities’ approach to removal of refugees from public spaces is framed by the 
broader rationality of the refugee camp, and the EU financing which supports the Serbian 
refugee camp system. Thus, whilst refugees face similar restrictions on the use of public 
spaces to other marginalised groups, they are also subjected to rationalities of (EU) border 
security and its financing of refugee camps. This means that refugees are subjected to 
different biopolitical and financial rationalities than other marginalised groups, such as 
constant surveillance, interventions and counting.    
EU funding has created new spaces (reception centres), towards which refugees are 
conducted by the state from 2015 onwards. Until the arrival of EU funds into Serbia, the 
country had a small number of refugee reception centres whose conditions were often poor. 
Many of the centres also housed Croatian Serb refugees from the 1990s, and as two of my 
interviewees commented, the conditions in which Croatian refugees lived were poor and the 
spaces neglected10.  With the arrival of new refugees, the camp subsequently received various 
streams of international and EU funding for refurbishment and services (including food, 
maintenance and security).  The existence of new and improved reception centres thus allows 
the state to adopt an openly interventionist narrative, in which officials often state that the best 
	
	
place for refugees is the camp, with its numerous services, food provision and security11. No 
such narrative is adopted for other marginalised populations – drug users, homeless, sex 
workers, the Roma – because no comparable spaces or policies exist for them locally. 
Subsequently, EU policies and funding dedicated to supporting refugees in Serbia, have also 
created hierarchies of marginalised populations, in which the non-refugee marginalised 
continue to be neglected by the state, whilst the ‘new’ arrivals receive funding, spaces and 
care because they are explicitly linked to the EU’s currently priorities and border security 
agenda.   
EU’s funding to Serbia is contingent on refugee bodies being present in camps –  refugees 
cannot access services unless they are registered as camp residents - and this produces 
rationalities, such as counting and surveillance, to which refugees are subjected but other 
marginalised groups are not. Camps themselves receive funding which is calculated per 
person residing there12. Camps also carry out a daily roll call of refugees, with updated daily 
lists sent to local police stations13 and the Commissariat for Refugees also publishes data on 
numbers of refugee camp residents14.  Refugees are also counted by aid organisations and 
volunteers who keep figures updates in order to know how many meals to prepare each day, 
for instance. Conversely, Serbia has no official statistics for the homeless population, for 
instance (Sarajlija et al 2014:167).   
Against this background, local authorities were engaged in a slow and subtle process of 
surveillance and monitoring of both refugees and activists using the parks. Both  refugees and 
solidarity activists using public spaces attracted the attention of local authorities in a way that 
other marginalised populations have not. Whilst Serbia has a rich tradition of public protest 
(see e.g. Jansen 2001), they have rarely coalesced around marginalised populations using 
those same public spaces. The visible presence of largely international and European 
volunteer-activists publicising the refugees’ plight, threatened Serbia’s official narratives of 
being a refugee-friendly country (see e.g. Naskovic 2017; this view was supported by 
interviews I conducted with Serbian Commissariat for Refugees staff in June 2018).   
It has been argued that the use of public spaces by refugees and their allies is an act of 
politics or re-appropriation of public spaces from which they are normally excluded (Johnson 
2016:958). This is certainly the case with many activist groups such as No Borders who 
consciously and explicitly frame their activities as political and resisting EU border regimes.  
For instance, throughout 2016, solidarity activists helped refugees assert their presence in the 
park (c.f. Johnson 2015) and occupy spaces by living there, participating in daily food 
distribution, organising sports activities, taking up space by e.g. distributing maps, information 
and refugees’ artwork on trees and later on, organising protests against the governments’ 
asylum laws. These activities helped constitute the parks as solidarity spaces and transformed 
the material environment (Pink 2008:166); in a way that other local marginalised groups are 
	
	
unable to do. As such, other marginalised groups such as the homeless or the Roma are not 
as ‘threatening’ to the local authorities whose approach towards them is often marked by 
indifference.  
Refugees and their solidarity support groups used the physical space in much more visible 
and disruptive way than other marginalised groups who do not have as many vocal and 
international allies, and their activity often took place in spaces on or near Waterfront sites. 
For instance, not only were the parks visibly marked by refugee presence with large Red Cross 
containers, tents, information huts, food stalls, photographs, graffiti and people themselves 
but the parks were also ‘renamed’ by refugees and activists. One was ‘Afghan Park’ (the parks 
also bore graffiti inscriptions such as ’Afgh’, names of individuals, and phone numbers of 
people on the move). Another nearby park was informally renamed into ‘Kurdish Park’ in 2017, 
after large numbers of Kurdish refugees started arriving and using this space to wait for 
smugglers15. ‘Afghan Park’ and ‘Kurdish Park’ are a few blocks away from each other, linked 
by a long street which later came to house two drop-in day centres for refugees. The area 
itself had been renamed ‘Refugee District’ by the refugees and smugglers16. 
However, it should perhaps be emphasised that it is the activist groups themselves that 
framed their activities in terms of resistance – for most refugees, and other aid groups like 
MSF or Info Park, the provision of aid in public spaces is seen mainly in terms of basic survival 
and immediate care. Nevertheless, the existence of robust voluntary aid networks allowed the 
government to concentrate its efforts on trying to conduct people towards camps and ‘conceal’ 
(c.f. Merry 2001) refugees away from public areas, rather than providing aid (outside of camps) 
themselves. Spatial regulation, as Merry (2001) argues is always temporal, and the Belgrade 
case shows that the local authorities intensified their efforts of conducing refugees towards 
camps just as EU borders ‘closed’ and Waterfront construction picked up pace. Some months 
after the parks were cleared (discussed further below) the park closest to the bus station was 
partly closed off with a construction fence advertising the Waterfront ‘Park View’ apartments.  
 Biopolitical control was not only exercised upon the refugee population once they were 
living in the parks, rather, they were already subjects of a biopolitical and regulatory regime 
prior to their arrival. The biopolitics of the camp - the attempts to create self-regulating subjects 
who would deliver themselves to the camp without coercion - is precisely what led to parks 
becoming informal settlements.  Some refugees ‘chose’, specifically, not to enter the camp 
and to subject themselves to further regulatory practices which limited mobility, created 
routines and cut refugees off from smugglers and aid providers.    
Whilst the local authorities never made the link between refugee presence and the 
Waterfront development explicit, they did engage in a series of evictions, surveillance activities 
and demolitions in and around the Waterfront site, around the time that Waterfront construction 
began, and with direct effect on the refugee population. The presence of state authorities was 
	
	
not always felt directly - whilst there was some police presence in the parks, and surveillance 
of the refugee population increased, it never reached the levels of policing seen in other places 
such as Hungary (especially along the border). The Belgrade case demonstrates ‘governance 
at a distance’ (Barry et al 1996; Springer 2010): the state and its institutions (border 
enforcement or national police) were often invisible, with regulatory power diffused to various 
actors, some of whom are not normally involved in migration nor policing - demolition crews, 
or park maintenance, for instance. It demonstrates what Ferguson and Gupta (2002:984) 
called the ‘less dramatic, multiple, mundane domains of bureaucratic practice by which states 
reproduce spatial riders and scalar hierarchies’.  
Whilst biopolitical control and surveillance of refugees and migrants tends to be 
concentrated along border zones (Topak 2014:830), it is also evident in seemingly innocuous, 
everyday spaces that do not immediately seem to have a relevance to migration policies. In 
Belgrade, surveillance and biopolitical control of the parks increased over 2015 and 2016, and 
eventually pushed most of the refugees out of the parks. However, surveillance was 
predominantly carried out by local authorities including the Belgrade ‘communal’ (municipal) 
police, a subdivision of the Serbian police force concerned primarily with enforcement of rules 
and regulations that fall within the jurisdiction of the city such as noise disturbance; and the 
Commissariat for Refugees, a bureaucratic government department whose workers patrol the 
parks on a daily basis, but have no law enforcement powers.    
 Throughout 2016, No Border activists started to report increasingly intrusive questioning 
by the police and Commissariat staff, who confronted them in the parks17. One activist reports 
verbal harassment18. Simultaneously, refugees began reporting that they often found park 
surfaces soaking in water (having been ‘cleaned’ by the street cleaning teams) which 
prevented them from sleeping there, and repeated incidents of police officers disrupting 
individuals by shining torches into their tents at night.  
One key practice that allowed local authorities to enhance their surveillance and security 
performances, was the construction of a large orange fences that bisected the parks and made 
them virtually impossible to use. The plastic orange fences were built in July 2016 by park 
maintenance teams. Activists claim that they were told that new grass was being planted 
behind fenced areas. They saw this as an unsubtle attempt to restrict their use of the park. 
The immediate effect the fence had was to cut off most of the park from use, recalling Mitchell’s 
(1995) points on the subtle management of public spaces and Bulley’s (2016) observation that 
cities continually conduct flows of people in and out of specific areas. The fence made it more 
difficult for refugees to sleep in the park, and for aid to be provided. The fence is thus one 
instance of how state’s ‘institutional power was being spatialised’ in order to limit refugees’ 








Photo 2:  Food queues for the Refugee Aid Serbia meals. August 2016.  
 
Despite the fence, activists continued providing aid and making contact with refugees; 
however, free access to the park became a major point of contention and a focus of their work, 
and included a ‘Take back the park’ festival, in which they, local residents and refugees played 
music, and ‘decorated’ the fence with artwork. Their attempts at using public spaces to make 
	
	
a broader point about refugees’ right of presence reflects Creasap’s (2012:184) point that it is 
through challenging ‘who “belongs” in public (and in some cases, private), spaces’, everyday 
practices become ‘political work’.  
One effect of the fence - a biopolitical technology -  is that it made authorities’ surveillance 
of the park easier. The fence created corridors which channelled pedestrians towards the 
centre then back out of the park, and ensured that those wishing to hang about in the park, 
could do so only in the park’s central space - where Commissariat and police patrolled each 
day. Once the fences came down, the city put up new ‘Keep off the grass’ signs in English, 
Serbian, Farsi and Arabic: not only are such signs a rarity in Serbian parks, but the inclusion 
of English and Arabic makes it clear that this was an intervention aimed at refugees.  
Perhaps the clearest example of biopolitical tools employed by the authorities was the 
eviction of activists from the park and the outright banning of aid provision outside of camps. 
According to a number of aid organisations, the government has always discouraged food and 
medical aid distribution in the parks as it was a ‘pull factor’ into the city, which pushed people 
away from camps.  In October 2016, the Info Park NGO volunteers were evicted from the bus 
station park by city authorities. In November 2016, workers from two different agencies 
showed me a letter issued by the national government, directly forbidding the provision of aid 
‘in form of food, clothing, footwear, and supporting migrants to live outside of the transit-
reception centres. […] …especially on the territory of the City of Belgrade’. The letter - a 
biopolitical intervention into the lives of refugees - also adds that ‘living in transit-reception 
migrant and asylum centres [refugee camps], where help is available (food, accommodation, 
clothes, medicines, psycho-social help and healthcare), is in the best interest of the migrants.’ 
The letter, with its clear attempt at dispersing refugees from public spaces into reception 
centres, echoes the view that ‘the refugee camp is considered as the “proper” space for 
refugee populations, acting as a technology of spatial segregation that enables the 
containment of those displaced’ (Darling 2016:3). However, the dispersal of aid provision from 
the park helped create what became known amongst refugees and aid workers as the 
‘Refugee District’19, one street away, where three key agencies including Info Park and MSF 
are now located. Not only are the aid organisations now generally left alone by the authorities 
– the Info Park NGO provides meals for newly arrived refugees, even though the new rules 
forbid this – but they also cooperate with the Commissariat for Refugees and various official 
services. For instance, Commissariat staff and a team of social workers from the Department 
for Social Welfare, are now embedded at one of the relocated volunteer-run aid centres. This 
suggests that presence of refugees in the city is not tolerated when it is public, visible or 
explicitly politicised but is tolerated and even supported away from the open spaces and 
commercial areas.  Whilst the evictions from the park were meant to cut volunteer-run services 
for refugees, it is interesting to note that the evicted organisations such as Info Park now 
	
	
occupy larger premises and provide an even more comprehensive set of services to newly 
arrived refugees, including meals, computers, safe spaces and interpreters.     
The ‘subtle wielding of contemporary power’ (Doty 2011) through fencing, surveillance or 
eviction, illustrates Williams’ (2015:12) point that border and immigration reinforcement have 
undergone a ‘spatial diffusion’ in that they do not only take place at actual state borders but is 
diffused to other locations (Williams 2015:12; Darling 2016). Importantly, and in a slight 
departure from this view, the Belgrade case suggests that at city level at least, states do not 
enforce borders only by treating refugees and migrants as subjects of migration law. What is 
especially interesting - and what brings us to the Waterfront link - is that authorities were active 
in displacing and removing refugees from the park and other spaces related to the Waterfront 
development, but seemed to tolerate their presence in places that had no relationship to the 
new project, or were physically concealed from it (c.f. Merry 2001).  
 
Photo 3: The park, now vacated by aid groups and most refugees, advertising Waterfront 
‘Park View’ Apartments. October 2017.  
 
No Border Squat / ‘The Gallery Promenade’ 
 
After being pushed out of the parks the refugees refusing accommodation in official camps, 
found themselves in two separate, derelict sites nearby. Both became informal settlements; 
however, both also happened to be on land acquired for the Waterfront project. Whilst the two 
refugee squats have much more of an explicit link to the Waterfront development, it is mainly 
because of the biopolitical regulation of the parks that they found themselves using these sites 
in the first place. In 2015, as aid became more difficult to administer in the parks, a popular 
	
	
local club called ‘Mixer House’ stepped in to help by allowing their beer garden and concert 
venue called ‘Miksaliste’, to be used as an aid delivery point. Mixer House is located in 
Savamala, discussed above, on a street mostly incorporated into the Waterfront development.   
The aid centre that came to be known as ‘Miksaliste’ was a small, open-air yard with 
volunteers (both local and European) providing food, water, clothing and footwear to several 
hundred refugees a day at the peak of the crisis. By autumn 2015, some of the businesses 
from the street and nearby had been moved and demolition of parts of the area had begun, in 
readiness for construction of Waterfront, whose billboards and advertising dominated the 
entire area.   
Discussing cities as key sites of political action and revolt, Harvey (2012:118) notes that 
‘political protests frequently gauge their effectiveness in terms of their ability to disrupt urban 
economies.’ The aid centre captures this dynamic as it disrupts the neoliberal order. In 
capitalist terms of the Waterfront project, the aid centre sat on a very expensive piece of real 
estate. When the bulldozing of the street began, this aid site literally stood in the way of the 
planned building works. It was also a site occupied by people who have no ‘value’ in a capitalist 
sense - the refugees and volunteers. The site thus ‘devalues’ the street and the Waterfront 
development, whilst showing the potential to ‘build a political city out of the debilitating 
processes of neoliberal urbanization, and thereby reclaim the city for anti-capitalist struggle’ 
(Harvey 0212:150).  
Next door to the improvised aid centre, activists arriving from Greece occupied a vacant 
building, fixed it up with refugees and created the so called ’No Border Squat’. The building, a 
former bar, was also on a part of the street earmarked for demolition and the Waterfront 
development. Squatting, as Creasap (2012:185) highlights, is one form of place-based politics 
that has a special resonance in European left-wing movements, particularly as it is often 
associated with challenging corporatization or housing inequalities (Creasap 2012:185). It has 
practical aim, such as providing accommodation for the homeless (Creasp 2012), but, as 
Chatterton points out, it also seeks to create space for ‘the less “desirable” denizens of urban 
life’, particularly those that ‘do not have consumerism as their main reason for participation in 
the city’ (Chatterton 2002:2). Locally, the squatter movement is under-developed as compared 
to its counterparts in the rest of Europe, and the labelling of the new refugee house as a ‘squat’ 
(using the English word) came primarily from European activists volunteering in Serbia. 
The squat was basic, and had no furniture20.  There was enough space for around fifty 
people but the numbers staying in the squat depended on the weather; one activist estimates 
that eighty people sheltered in the squat one rainy night. Mirroring the horizontal organisation 
of many squats globally, the residents and activists set up house rules: no alcohol, no open 
fires, no stealing) during an assembly. One activist I spoke to said they saw this as the 
beginning of a community, and refugees living there started to refer to the squat as their home.   
	
	
 Only a month after it started operating, on 24 April 2016 (incidentally, parliamentary 
election night) the squat was bulldozed together with 12 other buildings on this block (including 
Miksaliste Aid Centre, discussed above), allegedly by local authorities - though, the exact 
circumstances and actors involved are still unclear (see Krik 2018). Occupants of the aid 
centre, Refugee Aid Serbia, received an eviction notice and were given only forty-eight hours 
to comply. Despite Waterfront signage and site plans popping up on the street soon after the 
demolitions, and despite Belgrade City Mayor Sinisa Mali making the link between the 
demolitions and Waterfront explicit - it is still unknown who actually hired the demolition crew, 
gave the order, and what the name of the demolition company was (Krik 2018), resonating 
with much of the theoretical literature on post-socialist clientelism, deregulation and ‘wild 
capitalism’ (Upchurch and Marinkovic 2011).  
 The squat activists and occupants decided not to fight the eviction since, ‘a squat is the 
community, and this was just a building’21. On demolition day, most refugees dispersed before 
the police arrived, but around seven remained, and were persuaded (or rather, threatened 
with jail if they failed to comply, according to activists present) by the police to register and to 
accept accommodation at a refugee camp22. At the time, one activist notes, ‘we didn’t know 
the scale of the [Waterfront] project, but we felt it’23. 
  Whilst the demolitions were not specifically targeted at refugees, they had an immediate 
biopolitical effect on refugees passing through Belgrade. The systematic, if insidious and 
bureaucratic, displacement of refugees and aid providers from key spaces in the city, meant 
that as each phase of Waterfront construction began, refugees became less visible, either 
because they finally accepted places in camps, or because they had to keep moving from 
building to building in order to find accommodation. 
Today, the former site of the aid distribution centre is a tidy, white-washed square and 
‘Gallery Promenade’ stretching onto a riverside walkway built by the Waterfront developers. It 
is a space which ‘creates expectations of behaviour and a system that is ‘not targeted at 
reforming the individual’ but rather on ‘inducing cooperation with populations without 
individualising the object of regulation’ (Merry 2001:20). Despite a large area around the 
former aid site and newly build Waterfront ‘promenade’ being made available for public use, 
in reality, refugee populations and solidarity activists do not enter nor use this space as they 
have been subtly conducted away from it. The promenade is busy, exposed and on a river 
bank, which makes it a long and narrow space unsuitable for any kind of aid delivery, 
concealed activities or congregation. The demolished aid centre (now known as Refugee Aid 
Serbia Miksaliste) has relocated to a vacant property of a bankrupt state-owned construction 
company, in the ‘Refugee District’, about five minutes’ walk from the old site and on a street 
running alongside the park (incidentally, the new building is owned by the same state-owned 
company operates the Refugee Reception Centre Krnjaca, on the outskirs of Belgrade). 
	
	
According to a volunteer working there, officials from the Commissariat for Refugees helped 
Refugee Aid Serbia obtain tenancy of the new site, highlighting the messiness of informal aid 
and their relationships to state authorities. Likewise, this suggests yet again that presence of 
refugees is tolerated in specific concealed and contained areas, away from commercial sites.       
  
Photo 4: Demolished aid centre and the start of construction of Waterfront’s ‘Gallery 
Promenade’, August 2016.  
 
‘The Barracks’/‘BW Residence’  
 
The displacement of refugees from parks and demolition of the Savamala area led to the 
development of a second squat site on a derelict yard behind the train station - land also 
acquired for the Waterfront development. The yard was large and consisted of around a dozen 
barracks formerly used by railway workers and other residents, derelict warehouses and 
former cargo buildings, all vacated ahead of Waterfront construction. The site was empty of 
residents when it was ‘discovered’ and squatted by refugees around spring or summer of 
201624 – the exact details are unknown.   
Aid workers estimated that several hundred people were living on this site (other activists 
suggest higher figures) - mainly men, though other local activists note seeing teenagers and 
some children25. There was no electricity on the site, no running water apart from a single tap,  
no facilities and no rubbish disposal. Some barracks had no windows, or had holes in the roof.    
Unlike the parks across the road, the barracks were, at first, largely left alone by police. 
The Commissariat officials carried out daily patrols of the site to try and convince people to 
move to camps, but according to activists working at the barracks, the patrols appeared to be 
a formality and the staff rarely engaged with the refugees and appeared largely disinterested. 
There were no reports of arrests or altercations with the police until the demolition of the 
barracks, which suggests that the local authorities either tolerated the presence of refugees 
in the derelict site because they were ‘concealed’ (Merry 2001). Refugees squatted the site 
for around six months before they were evicted, and almost immediately upon their eviction, 
the barracks were demolished and construction of the ‘BW Residence’ part of the Waterfront 
project began. On eviction day, refugees were encouraged to register for camps, and transport 
was provided. Subsequently, the Obrenovac Reception Centre near Belgrade was opened 
mainly with the aim of accommodating the squatters, many of whom are still residing in the 
centre at the time of writing26.   
The situation recalls again Merry’s (2001) point that spatial governmentality is temporal, 
with specific populations being tolerated only on specific sites and at specific times, but not 
others. This illustrates the broader discussions of how urban space is managed such that the 
	
	
‘undesirable’ people are conducted away from public spaces, and into the marginal, precarious 
sites that are perhaps seen as ‘suitable’ for this population (Bulley 2016; Mitchell 1997).   
 
Photo 4: Belgrade Waterfront ‘BW Residences’ viewed from the train station. Rubble in 
front of the Waterfront building is from the demolished Barracks squat. October 2018. 
 
Refugees are still arriving into Belgrade, and according to aid workers, many still sleep in 
parks or in the new Refugee Aid Miksaliste building whilst waiting for smugglers. New squats 
are constantly cropping up: one in a vacant and derelict building in the ‘Refugee District’ and 
one in a former department store (now vacated; and also on Waterfront land, according to the 
developers’ maps). Others crop up in disused garages, and frequently, a smuggler will charge 
refugees’ ‘rent’ (Augustova n.d.). This practice attests to the messiness of informal spaces and 
squats, which should not solely be seen in terms of ‘resistance’ to border regimes and 
neoliberalism. Aid workers have largely stopped delivering aid to the refugee population living 
in these informal spaces because they have become difficult to reach and find, and according 




  This paper examined the spatial and urban politics of the refugee crisis by looking at the 
ways in which biopolitical and the logic of capitalism intersect in what might be labelled the 
migration-neoliberalism nexus. Specifically, the paper examined the effects this nexus has on 
refugee lives and their ability to use city spaces, create networks and obtain aid. The paper 
showed that states can appear to be supportive of refugees (not being constantly or explicitly 
	
	
xenophobic for instance, or by organising care in refugee camps) whilst at the same time 
deploying banal or everyday practices aimed at displacing refugees from public and 
commercial sites, and towards camps - or at least, out of public/investor view.  
 Biopolitical power of the state towards refugees is diffused to a vast network of actors who 
do the work of the state - ‘anonymous’ demolition companies that bulldoze the squat; the 
relatively anonymous investors pushing for a return on their investment and for their project to 
proceed and so on. This allows the state to govern at a distance (Barry et al 1996), 
disassociating themselves also from the worsening conditions for refugees outside of the 
camp system. The culmination of different biopolitical practices - the fence, patrols, 
surveillance of public places, and demolition of dwellings and support structures to make way 
for the Waterfront development, was ultimately successful in disrupting refugee-activist 
communities and conducting them away from centrally located spaces, yet, the state itself was 
rarely visible and present. 
However, the paper also identified that there is a crucial difference between how refugees 
in urban centres are treated by local authorities, in comparison to other marginalised 
populations who are also pushed out of commercial and high value spaces. That difference 
hinges on the existence of the camp system, towards which refugees are constantly pushed. 
The presence of EU donor capital incentivises transit states such as Serbia to persist with 
policies which conduct all refugees into official camps. Refugee camps may be peripheral to 
cities in the sense that they are not geographically close, but the biopolitical rationalities that 
refugees in city centres are subjected to are shaped heavily by the camp system. Rather than 
seeing the camp and the city as dichotomous, it is more productive to think of them as related: 
local authorities are able to simultaneously push refugees out of commercial centres whilst 
drawing on the notion of a camp as a ‘legitimate’ space for refugee populations. Thus, by 
deploying the interventionist narrative that camps are ‘the best’ spaces for refugees, 
authorities are able to avoid charges of neglect and abandonment of this population, whilst 
evicting them from derelict spaces earmarked for development.  
Many of the sites described in this paper have now been demolished or evicted.   What 
the Belgrade case has shown is that refugees - in addition to learning to navigate international 
borders and evade capture and surveillance - also have to learn to navigate cities in similar 
ways. Once in the city, they have to learn to manage asylum systems, but also have to become 
aware of local politics and land disputes, which have a direct effect on their movements across 
urban spaces.    
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